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I. INTRODUCTION
"My blood was boiling. We were going to find out who did this,
and kick their ass."' It is September 11, 2001, approximately 9:43 a.m.,
and the President has just been informed that a plane has crashed into
the Pentagon. By this time, two planes have already crashed into the
World Trade Center, and it is clear that the United States is under attack.
The President-and the nation-would experience a wide range of emo-
tions over the next several days, but the decisions made during that time
frame would reshape American foreign policy and international law for-
ever. This Article will explore the decisions made during the unprece-
dented chaos and uncertainty of the four-day time span from September
11, 2001, (when the United States was attacked) to September 14, 2001,
* Brian M. Stewart earned his J.D. from the University of Miami School of Law in 2013
and his B.A. in Political Science from New College of Florida in 2000. The author would like to
thank Professor Mary Anne Franks for her support in writing this Article. The author would like to
especially thank Gunnery Sergeant Hawkeye Norman, USMC, for his input, his friendship, and
his service to the country.
1. GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 128 (2010).
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(when Congress authorized the use of military force to hunt down those
responsible). This Article will examine the biases and heuristics that
affect decision-making in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack
and will argue that many major decisions following a terrorist attack
should be subjected to a "cooling off' period to more effectively allow
rationality to guide those choices.
Section II of this Article discusses the purposes behind terrorist acts
in general and how terrorist groups use fear to get their enemies to sub-
consciously enact self-destructive policies. Section III examines deci-
sion-making processes in times of crisis, specifically discussing the
biases triggered by acts of terror. Section IV scrutinizes the government
action in the four days that followed the terrorist attacks, including the
Bush Doctrine and the Authorization for Use of Military Force. Section
V argues that it is necessary to create uniform policies for reacting to
acts of terror in order to prevent bias from negatively affecting the larger
long-term goals of American society.
There is perhaps a need for a disclaimer, though. More than twelve
years have passed since the traumatic chain of events that transpired on
that surreal Tuesday morning. Although most Americans of a certain age
will remember exactly where they were that morning, it is quite impossi-
ble to experience the same emotions that took a collective hold over the
nation during that frightful time. Many might claim to have vivid memo-
ries of where they were, what they were doing, or what they were think-
ing on that particular morning;2 however, memory is generally not
acutely reliable. Furthermore, due to the various factors at work that
morning and the abundance of graphic images in the days and weeks
that followed, detailed memories of those days' events may be particu-
larly susceptible to corruption.3 With distance comes perspective, and
there is certainly an element of hindsight bias in effect when scrutinizing
the actions of those dealing with an unprecedented crisis.' This Article is
2. That particular day has taken on such significance that it has effectively become a "border
in time," a moment that separates the "before" from the "after" and marks a new beginning in
history. See generally Tom LUNDBORG, POLITICS OF THE EVENT: TIME, MOVEMENT, BECOMING I
(2012).
3. For example, on several occasions, President Bush stated that he saw the first plane hit the
World Trade Center on television while waiting to go into a classroom on September 11.
However, there was no live footage of the first crash, and amateur footage did not surface until the
next day. Nor did Bush witness the second plane hit the World Trade Center as it happened. A
spokesman later refers to Bush's repeated statements as "just a mistaken recollection." PAUL
THOMPSON, CTR. FOR Coop. RESEARCH, THE TERROR TIMELINE 388 (2004).
4. "In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in
foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but also to
view it as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before it happened. People believe that others
should have been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case." Baruch
Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in
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not intended to unfairly criticize the decisions made during that period
by recklessly wielding the lens of history but is intended rather to
explore the biases that affected decision-making at the highest levels of
government during one of the most unimaginable junctures in American
history. By understanding the biases that are triggered by terrorist
attacks, decision-makers can better understand how to avoid making
impulsive and counterproductive decisions.
II. INSIDE THE MINDS OF TERRORISTS
A. Terrorism Generally
In order to determine what heuristics and biases are triggered in
decision-making related to terrorism, a brief understanding of terrorism
itself is necessary. However, the term "terrorism" is loaded with mean-
ing, and no simple definition is possible. The FBI, Department of
Defense, Congress, and the U.N. each have different definitions. There
are even competing definitions within the U.S. Code. In one section,
terrorism is defined broadly as acts dangerous to human life that appear
to be intended "to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnap-
ping."' In another, terrorism is defined as "premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subna-
tional groups or clandestine agents."6
For the purposes of this Article, a precise definition is not neces-
sary, for this Article merely seeks to examine reactions to terrorism.
While terrorism is used to fulfill political or ideological goals of the
terrorist organizations, it is also designed to elicit certain responses. The
design is not to cause a reaction but to cause an overreaction.' Terrorism
is designed to leave a psychological impact far greater than the physical
impact.' This is one of the reasons that terrorists target important sym-
bols (e.g., the Capitol)-successful attacks on prominent symbols create
a more pronounced psychological wound, causing those attacked to dis-
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)-(B), (5)(A)-(B) (2012). Also included in the statute defining
terrorism are "act[s] of war," which include any acts occurring in the course of "declared war;
armed conflict, whether or not war has been declared, between two or more nations; or armed
conflict between military forces of any origin." 18 U.S.C. § 2331(4) (2012).
6. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012).
7. See Fareed Zakaria, Don't Panic. Fear is al-Qaeda's Real Goal, WASH. POST, Jan. 11,
2010, at A3 ("The purpose of terrorism is to provoke an overreaction . . . Terrorism is an unusual
military tactic in that it depends on the response of the onlookers. If we are not terrorized, then the
attack didn't work. Alas, this one worked very well.").
8. LOUISE RICHARDSON, WHAT TERRORISTS WANT 5 (2006).
2014] 765
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
proportionately gauge the abilities of the enemy.'
While some terrorist organizations want to scare their enemies into
making specific decisions (e.g., the release of prisoners), many others
design their tactics to scare their enemies into making certain types of
decisions. Often, the terrorists will not have a good idea about what kind
of reaction to expect, but instead they seek to force their enemies to
make decisions while under the influence of shock, anger, fear, and
humiliation.'o Some organizations hope for a forceful response in order
to demonstrate that their enemies are every bit as dangerous as the ter-
rorists made them out to be." The Bush administration's reaction to
9/11 was particularly fitting for painting a negative picture of America.
According to one scholar, "[flor Osama, the Bush administration has
proven to be a perfect foil for his anti-Western jihad: arrogant, bullying,
culturally insensitive, diplomatically inept, dishonest, unilateral, and
militaristic. The jihadis could not have imagined a better enemy to point
out the multiple sins of the infidel 'leader of the free world."'" 2
B. What al-Qaeda Wanted Out of 9/11
Although September 11, 2001 will often delineate the day the war
on terror began, Osama bin Laden had been at war with the United
States since August 23, 1996, when he issued his "Declaration of War
Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places."' 3
Fueled by religious zealotry, bin Laden had for years decried the West-
ern "occupation" of Islamic lands and built up his resources in his desire
to drive the Westerners out, specifically singling out U.S. forces as a
target for attack.' 4 However, bin Laden never definitively stated his
goals, broadly stating that he would not call off his jihad against the
United States until the U.S. stopped all aggressive action against Mus-
lims everywhere and ended the "Western and American influence in
[Muslim] countries."" Lacking clear motivation, bin Laden seemed to
be more interested in destroying the existing system than designing his
own.
It is often believed that bin Laden was deliberately trying to pro-
9. Id. at 4-5.
10. Id. at 99.
11. Id.
12. PAUL G BUCHANAN, WrrH DISTANCE COMES PERSPECTIVE: ESSAYS ON POLrrICS,
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 231 (2005).
13. LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11 234
(2006).
14. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
59 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
15. RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 84.
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voke the United States into using force as a way of creating a war
between Islam and the West.1 6 Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's second
in command, in describing why al-Qaeda wanted to attack the United
States, stated, "[T]hey will face one of two bitter choices: Either person-
ally wage battle against the Muslims, which means the battle will turn
into clear cut jihad against infidels, or they reconsider their plans after
acknowledging the failure of the brutal and violent confrontation against
Muslims."" If nothing else, an overreaction by the U.S. could be calcu-
lated to be large-scale, expensive, time-consuming, distracting, and
counterproductive.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed-the man who designed the 9/11
plan-felt the best way to influence U.S. policy was by targeting the
American economy." Destroying the American economy became a
major strategy for accomplishing al-Qaeda's goals; bin Laden repeatedly
stated that the best way to drive Americans from the Muslim world was
to bankrupt the U.S. by drawing them into a series of small but expen-
sive wars." To date, the "war on terror"-including the war on Iraq-
has cost the United States more than $2.2 trillion (not including opportu-
nity costs and social costs).2 0 Not only that, but that number is only a
down payment; spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is likely to
cost between $3.7 trillion and $4.4 trillion, with another $1 trillion cost
associated with borrowing the money to perpetuate those wars.2'
Furthermore, not only can the weakened economy be traced to the
war on terror, but the American response to the attacks also weakened
national security and compromised American principles. 2 2 These conse-
quences can be directly tied to the course of action that was decided on
in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Section IV will further discuss
the decisions made during that time frame, but a discussion of the
heuristics involved in those decisions is useful for determining whether
16. Id. at 99.
17. Id. at 100.
18. 9/11 COMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 14, at 153. Mohammed also had great personal
ambitions. His original plan, rejected by bin Laden, was to hijack ten planes, nine of which would
crash into American targets. The tenth he would land himself, and, after killing all adult male
passengers on board, he would deliver a speech regarding U.S. support for Israel, the Philippines,
and repressive governments in the Arab world. Id. at 154.
19. NOAM CHOMSKY, 9-11: WAS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? 21 (2011).
20. Paul Danahar, U.S. Spent Trillions and Left Iraq in Violent Pieces, BBC NEWS (Nov. 1,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-24730270.
21. Mark Thompson, The $5 Trillion War on Terror, TIME (June 29, 2011), http://nation.time.
com/2011/06/29/the-5-trillion-war-on-terror.
22. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The True Cost of 9/11: Trillions and Trillions Wasted on Wars, a
Fiscal Catastrophe, a Weaker America, SLATE (Sept. 1, 2011, 4:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/business/project-syndicate/2011/09/the true cost of91 1.html.
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or not such consequences could even be contemplated before the search
for survivors was even complete.
III. DECISION-MAKING AND HEURISTICS
Facing an enormous amount of pressure to respond quickly, the
Bush administration decided within hours of the attacks that a large-
scale military response was needed. As the following discussion will
illustrate, though, there is no worse time to enact momentous policy
choices than immediately after a terrorist attack. At no time are policy-
makers' decisions more likely to be clouded by bias, yet clothed in
righteousness.
A. Automatic vs. Effortful Decision-Making
When a person makes judgments or engages in problem solving,
two separate processing systems are at work.2 3 The systems are often
referred to in psychology as System 1 and System 2. Daniel Kahneman
describes these two systems as follows:
* System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no
effort and no sense of voluntary control.
* System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that
demand it, including complex computations. The operations of Sys-
tem 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency,
choice, and concentration.24
These two systems operate simultaneously and affect each other, but
System 1 is the primary system that the brain uses to make decisions,
while System 2 is only activated when called upon to solve a problem or
answer a question that System 1 cannot.25
System 1 is an intuitive process common to all mammals.2 6 System
1 includes such skills necessary for survival as the ability to recognize
objects or perceive the world around us. 27 However, System 1 is also
capable of learning how to handle more complex tasks, such as reading
or playing chess, through repetition.2 8 System 1 operates continuously
and cannot be turned off at will. 29 It continually and effortlessly
observes and assesses situations without any specific intentions, shaping
23. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 819 (2001).
24. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOw 20-21 (2011).
25. Id. at 24.
26. Haidt, supra note 23, at 818 tbl.1.
27. KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 21.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 28.
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the beliefs and choices of System 2.30 The impressions, feelings, intu-
itions, and intentions that System 1 generates are turned into beliefs and
voluntary actions by System 2, often with little or no modification.3 1
System 2, on the other hand, normally operates at only a fraction of
its capacity, activating fully only when needed to answer a problem that
System 1 cannot or when things get difficult, such as when self-control
is required.32 Operation of System 2 is effortful, and since cognitive
resources are limited, System 1 is generally relied upon unless there is a
specific need to engage in systematic processing." One of the defining
characteristics of System 2 is laziness, "a reluctance to invest more
effort than is strictly necessary."34 The "law of least effort" applies to
both physical and cognitive exertion. It holds that "if there are several
ways of achieving the same goal, people will eventually gravitate to the
least demanding course of action."3 6 This is especially problematic
because System 1 is gullible, biased to believe, and will often answer
questions by substituting an easier question rather than by resolving a
complex matter.
Even when System 2 would otherwise be necessary to resolve a
difficult question, numerous factors can affect System 2's ability to pro-
cess information and make rational decisions. First, because operation of
System 2 requires effort, if the mind is stressed or tired, the additional
energy required to operate System 2 leads to reduced deliberation and
increased reliance on System 1.31 If the mind is otherwise preoccupied,
System 1 has a stronger influence on behavior and people are more
likely to give into temptation, since System 2 is responsible for self-
control (and because System 1 has a sweet tooth).39 Finally, because the
deliberative processes take time to reach logical outcomes, anything that
imposes time pressure on a judgment or decision will undermine the
operation of System 2.40
30. Id. at 24.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 24-25.
33. Haidt, supra note 23, at 820.
34. KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 31.
35. Id. at 35.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 81, 97.
38. Jules Lobel & George Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for
Substance in Foreign Policy and International Law, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2005).
39. KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 41. In a classic study, subjects were instructed to remember
either a two-digit or a seven-digit number as they walked to a different room. On the way to the
second room, the subjects were offered either fruit salad or a piece of cake. Those subjects asked
to remember the longer number were far more likely to chose the cake (63%) than those asked to
remember the shorter number (41%). Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1051-52.
40. Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1052.
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B. Heuristics Triggered by Terrorism
In order to make complicated decisions, especially where uncer-
tainty is involved, System 1 relies on a number of different heuristics-
mental shortcuts that reduce the complexity of assessment and predic-
tion."' Heuristics often lead to intuitive assumptions, regarding what is
true and right; however, these intuitions may be biased in that they are
prone to predictable errors.4 2 Although there are many different heuris-
tics that operate subconsciously to affect judgments and decisions, this
Article will explore only those most specifically triggered by terrorist
activities or related to counterterrorism responses.
1. AVAILABILITY
The availability heuristic is one of the most fundamental heuristics
that affects judgment.4 3 In the social context, "all heuristics are equal,
but availability is more equal than the others."4 4 Simply defined, the
availability heuristic is "the process of judging frequency by 'the ease
with which instances come to mind.' 4"" If one is asked to determine the
probability of an event occurring when statistical data is unavailable, the
individual will instead base the probability on his or her ability to think
of an illustration.4 6 Although this heuristic is useful in a variety of cir-
cumstances, availability can lead to the dangerous problem of neglecting
large risks while giving excessive attention to smaller risks.47
When it is easy to think of an example, that type of event will seem
to be more numerous than events of equal or lesser frequency that are
not as easy to bring to mind.48 There is perhaps nothing so designed to
trigger the availability heuristic more than a terrorist attack.
[Terrorism] induces an availability cascade. An extremely vivid im-
age of death and damage, constantly reinforced by media attention
and frequent conversations, becomes highly accessible, especially if
it is associated with a specific situation such as the sight of a bus. The
emotional arousal is associative, automatic, and uncontrolled, and it
produces an impulse for protective action. System 2 may "know" that
the probability is low, but this knowledge does not eliminate the self-
generated discomfort and the wish to avoid it. System 1 cannot be
41. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 531, 532-33 (2005).
42. Id. at 532.
43. KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 129-30.
44. Id. at 142 (citing Timur Kuran & Cass Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999)).
45. Id. at 129.
46. Sunstein, supra note 41, at 532.
47. Id.
48. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1974).
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turned off. The emotion is not only disproportionate to the probabil-
ity, it is also insensitive to the exact level of probability.49
Although part of the design in every terrorist attack is to create the
fear of future attacks,"o none have ever managed to trigger the availabil-
ity heuristic as effectively as 9/11. The familiarity of the targets, the
scale of the damage and loss of life, and the extensive media coverage
made it nearly impossible to erase the terrible images of that morning
from the forefront of the memory in the days, weeks, and months that
followed."' Whereas System 2 makes rational decisions by focusing on
costs and benefits, System 1 is easily distracted and highly swayed by
visual imagery.52 High visibility and the shock of destroying important
symbols-the Twin Towers, the Pentagon, the White House, and the
Capitol 5 3-were critical designs to the success of al-Qaeda's mission.
After the first plane hit the North Tower at 8:46 a.m., news traveled
quickly and millions had turned on their televisions to attempt to grasp
the situation. Although video of the incident would be shown again and
again, millions watched live as Flight 175-seemingly from out of
nowhere (and certainly not within the realm of imagination of most any-
one)-disappeared into the 78th through 84th floors of the South Tower
while traveling at approximately 590 mph.54 It was at that moment, 9:03
a.m., that it became clear that the first crash was no accident, and
that America was under attack from an unknown enemy. The entire
sequence, followed by the terrible images that ensued-the fire, death,
and destruction-was designed to be shocking, spectacular, and not eas-
ily forgettable. "In today's world, terrorists are the most significant prac-
49. KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 322-23. An availability cascade is defined as "a self-
sustaining chain of events, which may start from media reports of a relatively minor event and
lead up to public panic and large-scale government action." Id. at 142.
50. See id. at 144 ("In today's world, terrorists are the most significant practitioners of the art
of inducing availability cascades . . . . [lit is difficult to reason oneself into a state of complete
calm. Terrorism speaks directly to System 1.").
51. See, e.g., Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARv. L.
REv. 1217, 1230-31 (2002) ("Americans are all too familiar with video of planes crashing into the
towers, of office workers jumping from the ninetieth floor, and of the towers collapsing. Four
months after the attacks, the ruins of the World Trade Center are still smoldering in lower
Manhattan, and the skyline is eerily incomplete.").
52. Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1057.
53. It is unclear what the target was for United Flight 93 when a passenger revolt caused it to
crash into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Intelligence reports show that even the planners
were unclear about whether to attack the White House or the Capitol as late as August 2001, and
the hijackers may have had discretion to decide based on their risk assessments. 9/11 CoMMissioN
REPORT, supra note 14, at 248.
54. DANIEL R. BOWER, NAT'L TRANsP. SAFETY BD., RADAR DATA IMPACT SPEED STUDY:
AMERICAN AIRLiNEs FLIGHT 11 UNITED AIRLINis FLIGHT 175, at 2 (2002). Flight 11 was traveling
at approximately 430 knots (approximately 494 miles per hour, or 724 feet per second) at the time
it impacted the North Tower. Flight 175 was traveling at approximately 510 knots (approximately
587 miles per hour, or 861 feet per second) when it impacted the South Tower.
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titioners of the art of inducing availability cascades.... [I]t is difficult to
reason oneself into a state of complete calm. Terrorism speaks directly
to System 1.""
2. PROBABILITY NEGLECT
Closely related to the availability heuristic is probability neglect.56
Probability neglect also factors into the ability to judge risks. When
assessing risks, people often tend to focus on the outcome (as triggered
by availability) rather than on the actual probability of that outcome
occurring." The problem is that when attempting to calculate the
probability of a tragic event, such as a terrorist attack, people remain
focused on the numerator-the easily recallable event-and ignore the
denominator-the statistical likelihood of the event happening. When
especially strong emotions are involved, people will often not assess
probability at all; instead the brain concentrates solely on the outcome.59
This also holds true for highly responsive democratic institutions that
translate fear into law during periods of intense emotion.6 0
A classic example of this is an experiment that asked people to
estimate how many words in a 2,000-word section of a novel ended in
the letters "ing."6 1 Responders gave much larger estimates than those
asked to estimate how many words have "n" as the second-to-last letter
in the same work, despite the fact that the former category is a subset of
the latter.62 Similarly, people are willing to pay more for flight insurance
for losses resulting from terrorism than they are willing to pay for flight
insurance from all causes. 63 The thought of terrorism significantly
affects the ability and willingness to rationally calculate probability due
to the intense emotions and extreme visual imagery evoked when
attempting to determine the possibility of an attack. "The problem of
vivid, emotional miscalculation of risk is particularly acute in the
55. KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 144.
56. The difference between the two concepts is subtle. Availability answers the question of
probability by answering an easier question (What salient examples comes to mind?) rather than
the harder question (What is the statistical risk?). Probability neglect, on the other hand, occurs
when "visualization makes the issue of probability less relevant or even irrelevant." Cass R.
Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 82 (2002).
57. Id. at 86.
58. KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 144.
59. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate
Change, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 540 (2007).
60. Sunstein, supra note 56, at 87.
61. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STuD. 199, 203
(2006) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PsYcHoL. REv. 293, 295 (1983)).
62. Id.
63. Sunstein, supra note 56, at 81.
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antiterrorism context, since fear is a particularly strong emotion, imper-
vious to deliberate calculation."' After 9/11, risk assessments were dra-
matically overstated, with respondents estimating the likelihood that
they would be hurt in a terrorist attack at 20.5% and the likelihood that
the "average American" would be hurt at 47.8%. 5
C. Other Factors Triggered by Terrorism that Affect
Decision-Making
1. TEMPORAL IMMEDIACY
The nature of the attacks on 9/11 created a panicked sense of
urgency in the need to respond. While there were innumerable immedi-
ate crises to resolve (e.g., tending to the injured, taking preventative
measures to avoid other imminent attacks), there was also a sharp outcry
to respond quickly by hunting down and punishing those responsible.
Such sentiment would lead to reliance on intuition over calculation.
Intuition occurs quickly, effortlessly, and automatically, whereas reason-
ing occurs more slowly and requires more effort.6 6 Therefore, when
decisions are required quickly, people tend to rely on System 1 to jump
to conclusions, rather than taking the time to think through the details
with System 2. When System 2 is already tasked, time pressure makes it
even more difficult to think through a problem; "[t]he most effortful
forms of slow thinking are those that require you to think fast."67
Part of the way that terrorism works is by instigating a quick reac-
tion in which long-term consequences are undervalued or ignored. A
prompt decision to go to war in the wake of a terrorist act is not only
questionable policy, it is counter to constitutional design. Because of the
dangers that strong emotions play in decisions surrounding war, the
Framers of the Constitution specifically designated Congress to be the
branch responsible for its declaration. 68 Fearful that the executive might
act on emotional impulse, the Framers placed a check on Executive
authority by requiring the Commander-in-Chief to be subject to the slow
and deliberate process of legislative deliberation.69 As will be explained
in further detail in the next section, this constitutional check was lost in
the lack of congressional debate regarding the use of military force in
response to 9/11.
64. Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1070.
65. Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 959, 981 (2003).
66. Haidt, supra note 23, at 818.
67. KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 37.
68. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
69. Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1059-1061.
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2. ANGER/OUTRAGE
The Framers' concerns over strong emotions affecting executive
judgment regarding war were well-founded.70 Anger causes terrible dis-
tortions in the ability to make rational decisions, and there is no lack of
anger in the wake of a terrorist attack. Anger is one of the strongest
emotions that humans can experience, and any strong emotions that
come into play when making decisions "short-circuit the search for alter-
natives, distort the estimation of the probabilities of outcomes, and bias
the perception of the positive or negative value of the outcomes.""
Anger causes individuals to have an inflated sense of certainty, which in
turn makes them less inclined to process information systematically.7 2
Moreover, the higher the degree of certainty associated with anger, the
more susceptible people are to heuristic cues.7 3 Even worse, when peo-
ple are uncomfortable and unhappy, they are less likely to perform intui-
tive tasks effectively. Anger also leads people to rely more heavily on
dangerous stereotypes when making social judgments, leading to ques-
tionable moral decisions.
Anger stresses mental processing, allowing System 1 to dominate
decision-making. Moreover, because System 1 is gullible, people who
are exceptionally angry are likely to believe almost anything." "The
propriety of our moral sentiments is never so apt to be corrupted as
70. James Madison wrote, "[W]ar is in fact the true nurse of executive
aggrandizement ... the strongest passions and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast:
ambition, avarice, vanity, the honourable or venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the
desire and duty of peace." Id. at 1059 (citing James Madison, Helvidius No. 4, in WRTNGS OF
JAMES MADISON 174 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906)).
71. J. KEITH MURNIGHAN & JOHN C. MowEN, THE ART OF HIGH-STAKEs DECISION-MAKING
131 (2002).
72. Feigenson, supra note 65, at 964.
73. Id.
74. KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 69.
75. Feigenson, supra note 65, at 965.
76. Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1053. One of the more powerful passages in
George Orwell's 1984 describes the masses being deceived into believing they were at war with a
different enemy during the height of Hate Week:
On the sixth day of Hate Week . . . when the great orgasm was quivering to its
climax and the general hatred of Eurasia had boiled up into such delirium that if the
crowd could have got their hands on the two thousand Eurasian war criminals who
were to be publicly hanged on the last day of the proceedings, they would
unquestionably have torn them to pieces-at just this moment it had been
announced that Oceania was not after all at war with Eurasia. Oceania was at war
with Eastasia. Eurasia was an ally. . .. Without words, a wave of understanding
rippled through the crowd. Oceania was at war with Eastasia! The next moment
there was a tremendous commotion. The banners and posters with which the square
was decorated were all wrong! Quite half of them had the wrong faces on them. It
was sabotage!
GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM AND 1984 256-58 (2003).
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when the indulgent and partial spectator is at hand, while the indifferent
and impartial one is at a great distance."" This is particularly exacer-
bated when one is attacked. "[P]eople who feel attacked will be ready to
believe almost anything about their enemies.
3. TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY
Although many of the definitions of "terrorism" note the intention
to cause fear, few seem to focus on the intention to cause terror, a much
more heightened state of fear. Whereas fear connotes a general sense of
worry or alarm, terror is "a uniquely human response to the threat of
annihilation."" When mortality salience is high, people tend to suppress
the more general fear of mortality by associating more closely with their
cultural worldviews and by more harshly punishing anyone who violates
those cultural values.so This can be seen in the overwhelming patriotism
and "in-group" solidarity exhibited in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
However, whereas state-sponsored violence presents a very clear picture
of whom and what to be unified against, terrorist acts produce a much
more ambiguous presentation of who "they" are when taking an "us vs.
them" mentality. The enemy is framed in broad, general terms, often
invoking moral judgments. For example, in a speech to the United
Nations General Assembly, then-mayor of New York City Rudolph Giu-
liani implored,
Look at that destruction, that massive, senseless, cruel loss of human
life, and then I ask you to look in your hearts and recognize that there
is no room for neutrality on the issue of terrorism. You are either with
civilization or with terrorists. On one side is democracy, the rule of
law, and respect for human life; on the other is tyranny, arbitrary
executions, and mass murder. We are right and they are wrong. It is
as simple as that. And by that I mean that America and its allies are
right about democracy, about religious, political, and economic free-
dom. The terrorists are wrong, and in fact evil, in their mass destruc-
tion of human life in the name of addressing alleged injustices....
Those who practice terrorism-murdering or victimizing innocent
civilians-lose any right to have their cause understood by decent
people and lawful nations. On this issue-terrorism-the United
Nations must draw a line. The era of moral relativism between those
who practice or condone terrorism, and those nations who stand up
against it, must end. Moral relativism does not have a place in this
77. ADAM SurrH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 154 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie
eds., 1982).
78. Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1053.
79. Tom PYSZCZYNSKI ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF 9/11: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR 8 (2003).
80. Haidt, supra note 23, at 821.
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discussion and debate.81
How individuals cope with vivid reminders of their own death may
have additional implications on how those individuals successfully rec-
ognize and compensate for the biases that result from the heuristics at
work in decision-making and judgment. While people will cling more
closely to their cultural worldviews when confronted with the inevitabil-
ity of death, these worldviews in turn define the individual's sense of
self-worth as measured against those standards ascribed to.8 2 The anxi-
ety caused by awareness of one's mortality leads to highly ego-driven
responses to one's environment." This is problematic in compensating
for the negative effects of heuristic judgment because the effects of
highly-driven emotional responses are less amenable to correction or
debiasing than others."
4. PLANNING FALLACY
As a general matter, people tend to overconfidently view the out-
come of proposed action. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman coined
the term "planning fallacy" to describe plans and forecasts that unrealis-
tically expect to operate under a best-case scenario and could be
improved by examining statistics in related cases." People tend to be
overconfident in their projections of how everything will work out once
a plan is enacted, heavily discounting the probability of cost overruns,
time delays, and other factors. When forecasting the outcomes of risky
projects, executives "make decisions based on delusional optimism
rather than on a rational weighting of gains, losses, and probabili-
ties. . . . As a result, they pursue initiatives that are unlikely to come in
on budget or on time or to deliver the expected returns-or even to be
completed."" Those in positions of power who have the greatest influ-
ence on the lives of others are highly likely to be optimistic and over-
confident." Overconfidence also influences decisions by causing people
to fail to gather the information necessary to make the best decision."
Among the factors that people discount as a result of overconfi-
dence is the future. The willingness to take on risks that will not occur
81. Rudolph W. Giuliani, Combating Terrorism, 16 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETmics & PUB. POL'Y
57, 60-61 (2002) (published remarks from a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on
Oct. 1, 2001).
82. PyszczyNsxi Er AL., supra note 79, at 27.
83. Feigenson, supra note 65, at 974.
84. Id.
85. KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 250.
86. Id. at 252.
87. Id. at 256.
88. MURNGHAN & MowEN, supra note 71, at 49.
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until some future point is much greater than if those same risks will be
borne by the current generation.89 When risks will not be faced until the
distant future, and when availability is not triggered by consequences of
salient events, optimistic outlooks lead people to highly devalue long-
term risks.9 0 In the terrorism context, "the short-term satisfaction of
retaliatory military action against terrorists often is outweighed by the
long-term consequences."" However, given the myopia caused by all of
the emotions and heuristics triggered by terrorist attacks, it is exception-
ally difficult to recognize this fact when making decisions regarding
response.
IV. REACTION: DECIDING UNDER THE INFLUENCE,
9/11/01 TO 9/14/01
As described before, terrorism is used to elicit a reaction from the
targeted victims. By creating an environment of terror, fear, hostility,
anger, outrage, and uncertainty, terrorists hope that their targets will
make poor choices while blinded by these factors. As former CIA Direc-
tor James Woolsey has phrased it, an effective response to terrorism is
"at odds with it being prompt."9 2 However, the United States wasted
little time in enacting sweeping policies to respond to the attacks, all of
which were subject to the biases described above.
A. The Bush Doctrine
At 8:30 p.m. on September 11, just under twelve hours after the
first plane crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center,
President Bush addressed the nation for the third time that day. In his
speech, he declared his administration's approach to responding to the
acts that occurred earlier in the day, an approach that would later be
characterized as the "Bush Doctrine."9 3 This approach is best summa-
rized by the phrase that President Bush insisted on including in the
speech: "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who com-
mitted these acts and those who harbor them."94
The importance of this policy cannot be overstated. This was not
89. Sunstein, supra note 59, at 545.
90. Id.
91. Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1072.
92. Id.
93. The term "Bush Doctrine" has taken on several different meanings over the course of the
years that followed, but, for the purposes of this discussion, the term is used to describe the policy
announced on September 11, 2001. See Richard Starr, What Exactly is the 'Bush Doctrine'?,
WEEKLY STANDARD (Sept. 12, 2008, 2:08 AM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/
TWSFP/2008/09/what-exactlyisthe -bushAdoctr.asp.
94. KURT EICHENWALD, 500 DAYS: SECRETS AND Lias IN THE TERROR WARS 49 (2012).
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merely a measured response that any nation attacked would automati-
cally resort to, but rather a historic break from traditional international
law. Historically, under international law, a nation was not allowed to
use force against another nation preemptively; rather, the only permissi-
ble use of force was when a nation was either "being attacked or was in
imminent danger of attack."" By erasing the distinction between the
terrorists who committed the acts and the states that harbored them, the
United States was rejecting the traditional model of sovereign equality
and ushering in a new era with an essential message: You are either with
us, or you are against us.96 "In effect, the Bush Doctrine declares the
entire world-including supposedly sovereign foreign governments-to
be at once subject and instrument of the criminal justice apparatus of the
United States, and enforces these obligations with the threat of military
force.""
B. Biases Affecting the Bush Doctrine
As momentous as the Bush Doctrine was, it was not carefully delib-
erated over with full consideration of its possible consequences. In fact,
President Bush takes credit for making that decision himself while fly-
ing back to Washington, D.C. from a secure location on September 11.8
President Bush decided he would wait one day to tell the American peo-
ple we were at war, later stating in his memoir,
I did want to announce a major decision I had made: The United
States would consider any nation that harbored terrorists to be
responsible for the acts of those terrorists. This new doctrine over-
turned the approach of the past, which treated terrorist groups as dis-
tinct from their sponsors. We had to force nations to choose whether
they would fight the terrorists or share in their fate. And we had to
wage this war on the offense, by attacking the terrorists overseas
before they could attack us again at home."
Bush also stated that he wanted his speech to convey his sense of
"moral outrage."" This decision thus entailed all of the previously
described biases: making a quick decision under extreme time pressure
while focusing on the most available image that came to mind and ignor-
ing the statistical likelihood of similar occurrences, all while angry,
95. Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1072.
96. Note, supra note 51, at 1227.
97. Id.
98. This would place the decision at some point between 4:33 p.m., when Air Force One
departed from Offutt Air Force Base in Shreveport, Louisiana, and 6:42 p.m., when it landed in
Washington, D.C. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 466-67.
99. BUSH, supra note 1, at 137.
100. Id.
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stressed, and confronted with the inevitability of death. Moreover, while
President Bush was "untrained in national security" and admitted him-
self that he was "not a military tactician,""o' he was overwhelmingly
confident in his decision-even though he had not yet received formal
input from the State Department.10 2
There can be no doubt that Bush's judgment was clouded by anger
and a desire for revenge. Shortly after the third hijacked plane hit the
Pentagon, Bush turned to his staff and told them, "When we find out
who did this, they're not going to like me as president. Somebody is
going to pay."lO3 He was also impatient and wanted everything to unfold
as quickly as possible. On the evening of September 11, before his
speech to the nation, he told then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
"We've got to get [the Bush Doctrine] out there now."'" By September
13, Bush was pushing the Department of Defense for definitive attack
plans. Despite the fact that the National Security Council meetings had
been short and rushed over the previous two days and any level of con-
centration was difficult, Bush wanted concrete options within days.
"'This is a new world .... Start the clock. This is an opportunity. I want
a plan-costs, time. I need options on the table . . . . I want decisions
quick.' ""o" Apparently, the President was unfamiliar with the problems
associated with quick decision-making in times of crisis.
After delivering his speech announcing the Bush Doctrine to the
nation, the President met with his national security team. At the meeting,
Bush displayed his overconfidence and inability to grasp the conse-
quences of the broad approach he wanted to take. He told his team,
I want you all to understand that we are at war and we will stay at
war until this is done. Nothing else matters. Everything is available
for the pursuit of this war. Any barriers in your way, they're gone.
Any money you need, you have it. This is our only agenda.106
Untrained in international law, Bush had little patience for barriers that
might stand in the way of his agenda. When Secretary of Defense Don-
ald Rumsfeld told him that international law did not allow the use of
force for retribution, Bush yelled at him, "I don't care what the interna-
tional lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass."1o7
101. BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 33, 37 (2002).
102. Id. at 47. Secretary of State Colin Powell was in Lima, Peru on September 11 and was
unable to speak with the President until 7:00 p.m. that evening. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 467.
103. WOODWARD, supra note 101, at 17.
104. Id. at 31.
105. Id. at 62-63.
106. RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR 24
(2004).
107. Id.
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C. Congressional Authorization to Use Military Force
On September 12, the Office of the Attorney General began draft-
ing the Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF").'s However,
because it was unclear exactly who the enemy was or what the conflict
would look like, the authors wanted to use the broadest language possi-
ble in order to give the President as much authority as he could possibly
need.109 The proposal they came up with would have not only given the
President the power to use force against the perpetrators of 9/11, but
would have authorized the use of force to deter and preempt future acts
of terrorism.1 o The proposed language "would have seemingly autho-
rized the President, without durational limitation, and at his sole discre-
tion, to take military action against any nation, terrorist group or
individuals in the world without having to seek further authority from
Congress.""'
Even though the language was broad, there was good reason to
believe that Congress would adopt the resolution. On the way to Capitol
Hill to negotiate with Congress, the White House lawyers expressed
concern that Congress would never grant the President the broad author-
ity they were asking for. Nancy Dorn, Vice President Cheney's head of
legislative affairs, was confident that the trauma and raw emotions
would force Congress to acquiesce-no member of Congress would
want to be portrayed as an obstructionist or a sympathizer." 2 In the end,
she was only partially right."' The White House's proposal would give
the President the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force in
the United States, an unprecedented power. That phrase was omitted
before the resolution went to the Senate floor for vote, but other than
that, it remained almost exactly as drafted.114
On September 14, the Senate and the House of Representatives
heard and voted on the Authorization. Although some Senators ex-
pressed some hesitation concerning the broad powers they were enshrin-
ing the President with, the resolution passed unanimously by a vote of
ninety-eight to zero.' 15 The House then debated the resolution for
approximately five hours before passing it by a vote of 420-to-one late
108. EICHENWALD, supra note 94, at 59.
109. Id.
I 10. See infra APPENDIx B.
111. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22357, AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF
MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATrACKS (P.L. 107-40): LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2
(2007).
112. EICHENWALD, supra note 94, at 65.
113. For a comparison of the language proposed by the White House and the language adopted
by Congress, see infra APPENDIX B.
114. EICHENWALD, supra note 94, at 66-67.
115. GRIMMETT, supra note 111, at 3.
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that evening.11 6
The pace at which Congress passed this sweeping Presidential
authority was in response to the general feeling in the U.S. that some-
thing had to be done immediately to defend the country from further
attack and bring those responsible to justice. When a particularly nega-
tive and highly salient event occurs that triggers strong emotions, gov-
ernment will be pressured to act, even if the probability of a repeat
occurrence is low. 1 17 This is because demand for government action
corresponds to the perceived risk."s That risk is not calculated by statis-
tical analysis, but by what the mind can most easily recall. Congress,
designed to slowly and deliberately weigh the costs and benefits of pro-
posed legislation, especially as it pertains to war, 119 gave in to fear,
anger, and political pressure, and authorized the President to unilaterally
attack any person, organization, or nation the President felt was respon-
sible for 9/11. Because Congress did not fully contemplate the potential
consequences of that course of action before rushing the resolution
through, the AUMF has been used to justify numerous kinds of execu-
tive action that Congress did not anticipate. The AUMF's broad lan-
guage has been used to justify indefinite detention, torture, domestic
surveillance, and even the targeted killing of American citizens.120
Although not everything could be predicted, the urgency with which
Congress granted the President broad powers to accomplish ambiguous
goals masked the true nature of the problem the country was facing.
D. Biases at Work in the House of Representatives
The legislative history of the AUMF exhibits a lot of patriotic rhet-
oric and support for armed conflict but offers little deliberation regard-
ing the probability of another attack. One of the reasons for this is
because the spectacular nature of the attacks made them overwhelmingly
prominent in the recollection. Still fresh in the mind of the nation, many
Representatives added to the recollection by recounting their own
graphic stories of the carnage. Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY) described "the
mountains of rubble that once was the World Trade Center." 121 Bob
Menendez (D-NJ) likened the damage at Ground Zero to areas bombed
during World War 11.122 Some Representatives let the gruesome images
116. Id.
117. Sunstein, supra note 56, at 69.
118. Note, supra note 51, at 1229.
119. See supra Part III.C.2.
120. See generally Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2010) (Alien father sued the
U.S. government for the targeted killing of his son, a U.S. citizen living in Yemen.).
121. 147 CONG. REC. H5619, 5673 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001).
122. Id. at 5660.
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guide them: Jay Inslee (D-WA) said, "The vision of the World Trade
Center and the vision of the Citadel, symbol of democracy for this globe,
leads me to know in my heart and in my gut, this is the right thing for
our Nation to do." 12 3 With the powerful images imprinted on their
minds, the likelihood of another major attack at the time seemed
imminent. 124
Many of the Representatives exhibited probability neglect by dis-
cussing how the AUMF would prevent another attack without calculat-
ing what the probability of another attack would be without the AUMF.
Christopher Shays (R-CT) stated that he was "confident that authorizing
force will save lives by preventing future acts of terrorism."125 Dale
Kildee (D-MI) argued that Congress must give the President the power
"to take all necessary actions to prevent those responsible for these das-
tardly acts from again inflicting such cowardly malice against our peo-
ple." 26 Without a full understanding of the nature of the threat, the
members of the House were simply assuming that the perpetrators had
the means to successfully execute another attack unless we could attack
them first.
Because the demand for action from the people was great, Congress
was under intense temporal pressure from the President and the people
to do something and do it quickly. Steve Chabot (R-OH) stated, "The
message must go out to all who seek to harm us in the future that
America will respond to cowardly acts of violence against our people
quickly and decisively." 127 Even though they knew they were acting
blindly, some Representatives just felt the need to do something. Chaka
Fattah (D-PA) fit this profile, arguing, "We must respond. We know not
what the tactics or strategy or play of this engagement will be, but we
must act."1 28 Although under pressure to respond quickly, few expressed
grave concern over pushing through a hastily concocted scheme for war
before the plans were even designed or the enemy was clearly defined.
Other representatives exhibited their anger and desire for revenge.
Nick Smith (R-MI) used his time during the House debate to send a
message: "To those who have spilled the blood of American innocents,
and those who have harbored them, our message is a simple one . . . for
123. Id. at 5667.
124. See, e.g., Statement of Eni Faleomavaega (D-AS) ("I fear that the next chapter of
terrorism will be even more horrific and will likely involve weapons of mass destruction, such as
nuclear weapons and biological and chemical agents, which long have been available in the
international black market."). Id. at 5656.
125. Id. at 5665.
126. Id. at 5667.
127. Id. at 5661.
128. Id.
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what you have done, you will pay. You will pay." 29 Others felt the need
to cater to the anger of their constituents, such as Eva Clayton (D-NC),
who said, "Many of our citizens are angry, indeed, enraged and want to
strike back, and we must strike back."130 Many Representatives recog-
nized that they were angry, but assured themselves and their colleagues
that such emotions were not affecting their decisions. 13' Although recog-
nizing biases goes a long way in adjusting for them, anger is a particu-
larly strong emotion, which affects the ability to perform quantitative
judgments, including judgments about probability. 13 2
The Representatives also exhibited strong "in-group" judgments
based on moral judgments and strong confidence in the inevitable suc-
cess of the project, regardless of the lack of details. Dick Gephart (D-
MO) summed up this stance when he said,
I know in my heart we will prevail. We will face this foe, and we will
not adopt the characteristics of those who attack us. We will not for-
get the civil liberties of our people. We will not discriminate. We will
not use prejudice. We will not succumb to hatred in fighting this foe.
We will not be divided.133
A common theme throughout the floor debate was unity and certainty of
victory, a dangerous combination that led to serious miscalculations
regarding what would be needed to actually achieve that victory.
V. CONCLUSION
It is impossible to know how many lives were saved as a direct
result of the decisions made on September 11, 2001 and the three days
that followed. More than twelve years later, Osama bin Laden is dead,
the Taliban does not pose an imminent threat, but the United States con-
tinues to use the AUMF to fight the "war on terror" against groups not
even involved in the events of 9/11. 13 The decision to react to the ter-
rorist attacks with a sustained military campaign may have been the best
decision, but the timing and manner in which that decision was made
were anything but ideal. Terrorist attacks are unique in that they seek to
cause a disproportionate amount of psychological rather than physical
damage. By triggering strong feelings of anger, vivid reminders of
129. Id. at 5674.
130. Id. at 5673.
131. See, e.g., Statement by Stephanie Tubbs Jones (D-OH) ("Mr. Speaker, I am angry, as I am
sure most Americans are.. . . [B]ut we must not let our anger blow out our light of reason."). Id. at
5653.
132. Sunstein, supra note 56, at 70.
133. 147 CONG. REc. H5619, 5659 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001).
134. Graham Cronogue, Note, A New AUMF: Defining Combatants in the War on Terror, 22
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 377, 378 (2012).
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death, and endless distractions, terrorists attempt to force their enemies
into making critical decisions while they are incapable of fully assessing
the consequences of those choices. Should the United States ever suffer
from another terrorist attack, the President and Congress should be quick
to act in protecting the population but deliberate in deciding a long-term
solution to resolve the problem. Such an approach would surely help to
mitigate the effects of the various biases intentionally exploited by
terrorists.
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APPENDIX A - TIMELINE OF EVENTS' 3 5
September 11, 2001
8:46 a.m.: American Airlines Flight 11 crashes into the 93rd through
98th floors of the North Tower of the World Trade Center.
8:55 a.m.: President Bush is informed that a plane has hit the World
Trade Center while at a photo-op at Booker Elementary School in
Sarasota, Florida. At the time, the incident is believed to be an
accident.
9:03 a.m.: United Airlines Flight 175 crashes into the 78th through
84th floors of the South Tower of the World Trade Center. Millions
watch on live television. By this time, New York City and the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey had already mobilized the
largest rescue operation in New York City's history.
9:05 a.m.: President Bush is informed of the second strike. White
House Chief of Staff Andrew Card approaches Bush as he is listening
to children read a story and whispers in his ear, "A second plane hit
the other tower, and America's under attack."' 6 President Bush does
not openly react and remains quietly seated in the classroom for
approximately ten more minutes.
9:26 a.m.: An order is given forbidding every civilian, military, and
law enforcement aircraft from taking off and requiring all planes in
the air to land as soon as is reasonable. It is the first such order ever
given since the invention of flying in 1903. Accounts vary as to who
issued the order, from the head of the FAA, Jane Garvey, to the Sec-
retary of Transportation, Norman Mineta, to the FAA National Oper-
ations Manager, Ben Sliney, who was at his first day on the job.
Military and law enforcement aircraft are allowed to resume opera-
tions at 10:31 a.m.
9:29 a.m.: President Bush makes a scheduled speech from Booker
Elementary. He says, "Today, we've had a national tragedy. Two air-
planes have crashed into the World Trade Center in an apparent ter-
rorist attack on our country . . . . [I] have ordered that the full
resources of the federal government go to help the victims and their
families and to conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to
find those folks who committed this act. Terrorism against our nation
will not stand."13 7
135. All times are Eastern Standard Time. Times and data have been derived from numerous
sources, including GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION PoINTs (2010); KURT EICHENWALD, 500 DAYS:
SECRETS AND LIES IN THE TERROR WARS (2012); NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMIssioN REPORT (2004); PAUL THOMPSON, CTR. FOR COOP. RESEARCH,
THE TERROR TIMELINE (2004); RICHARD CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S
WAR ON TERROR (2004).
136. BUSH, supra note 1, at 127.
137. Id. at 128.
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9:32 a.m.: The New York Stock Exchange closes. It will remain
closed until September 17.
9:37 a.m.: American Airlines Flight 77 crashes into the west wall of
the Pentagon. All 64 people aboard Flight 77 are killed as well as 125
people inside the Pentagon.
9:43 a.m.: President Bush is informed of the attack on the Pentagon
as he is on his way to board Air Force One.
9:45 a.m.: President Bush speaks with Vice President Cheney. Ac-
cording to notes from the call, Bush tells Cheney, "Sounds like we
have a minor war going on here, I heard about the Pentagon. We're at
war ... somebody's going to pay."
9:45 a.m.: The White House is evacuated. Soon afterward, coun-
terterrorism "tsar," Richard Clarke, institutes Continuity of Govern-
ment plans, a program designed to relocate important government
officials to alternate command centers during a national emergency.
9:48 a.m.: The U.S. Capitol is evacuated. Speaker of the House, Den-
nis Hastert, and other key personnel in the line of succession to the
Presidency are taken to secure locations.
9:56 a.m.: Air Force One departs from Sarasota-Bradenton Interna-
tional Airport with no fixed destination. President Bush wants to
return to Washington, D.C. but is convinced by the Secret Service not
to do so. The airplane circles in a holding pattern until 10:35 a.m.
when it heads to Shreveport, Louisiana, finally landing at 11:45 a.m.
9:59 a.m.: The South Tower collapses; the 1 10-story, 1,362-foot tall
building takes ten seconds to collapse. Rescue personnel in the North
Tower are ordered to evacuate; many on the upper floors of the North
Tower are unaware that the South Tower has collapsed, believing
perhaps that a bomb has exploded.
10:00 a.m.-10:15 a.m.: At some point, President Bush and Vice Pres-
ident Cheney discuss authorization to shoot down civilian aircraft
suspected of being used as weapons by hijackers. Accounts vary as to
exactly when the authorization is given, but the message is not effec-
tively communicated to fighter pilots in time to prevent any further
attacks. President Bush refers to this as his "first decision as a war-
time commander in chief."' 38
10:03 a.m.: United Airlines Flight 93 crashes into a field in Shank-
sville, Pennsylvania. All 44 people on board-the two pilots, five
flight attendants, and thirty-seven passengers (plus the four hijack-
ers)-are killed on impact.
10:06 a.m.: President Bush is informed of the Flight 93 crash. He
138. Id.
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asks, "Did we shoot it down or did it crash?"' 3 9 It is not until several
hours later that he is assured that the plane crashed.
10:10 a.m.: Military forces are placed on DEFCON 3, the highest
alert since 1973. Indicating defense readiness condition, DEFCON 3
places the military at a heightened state of readiness.
10:28 a.m.: The North Tower collapses; at 110 stories and 1,368 feet
high, it was at one time the tallest building in the world. Between the
two towers, 2,973 people are killed, including 343 FDNY personnel,
37 PAPD personnel, and 23 NYPD personnel.
11:00 a.m.: Skyscrapers and tourist attractions across the United
States are evacuated.
12:16 p.m.: Domestic skies in the United States are completely clear
of civilian aircraft. Civilian flight will not resume until September 13.
12:36 p.m.: President Bush records a second speech from the Barks-
dale Air Force Base in Shreveport, Louisiana. The speech will air on
television at 1:04 p.m. He begins, "Freedom itself was attacked this
morning by a faceless coward. And freedom will be defended ....
Make no mistake, the United States will hunt down and punish those
responsible for these cowardly acts."1 40
1:27 p.m.: A state of emergency is declared in Washington, D.C.
1:30 p.m.: President Bush leaves Louisiana and is transported to
Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska where the U.S. Strategic Com-
mand is located.
2:50 p.m.: President Bush arrives in Nebraska and is taken to an
underground bunker designed to withstand a nuclear blast. While
there, he communicates with top officials, including Vice President
Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armit-
age, CIA Director George Tenet, counterterrorism "tsar" Richard
Clarke, Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta, and others. Pres-
ident Bush begins the conference with a clear declaration: "We are at
war against terror. From this day forward, this is the new priority of
our administration."141
4:33 p.m.: Air Force One leaves Offutt Air Force Base to return to
Washington, D.C. It will land in Washington at 6:42 p.m. During this
flight, President Bush makes the decision that the United States
would consider any nation that harbored terrorists to be responsible
for the acts of those terrorists.
5:20 p.m.: World Trade Center Building 7, a 47-story tower, col-
139. Id. at 131.
140. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 463.
141. BUSH, supra note 1, at 134.
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lapses. The area around the building had been evacuated nearly 50
minutes earlier, and no one is killed by the collapse. Although it was
not hit by a plane, damage to the building was visible following the
collapse of the North and South Towers, and it was reported to be on
fire at 4:10 p.m.
6:54 p.m.: President Bush arrives at the White House by Marine One,
the Presidential helicopter.
8:30 p.m.: President Bush delivers his third speech of the day, this
one from the Oval Office. During the speech, he announces what
comes to be known as the Bush Doctrine, stating, "I've directed the
full resources for our intelligence and law enforcement communities
to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will make no
distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those
who harbor them."' 4 2
9:00 p.m.: President Bush meets with a small group of key advisers.
Bush tells them, "I want you all to understand that we are at war and
we will stay at war until this is done. Nothing else matters. Every-
thing is available for the pursuit of this war. Any barriers in your
way, they're gone. Any money you need, you have it. This is our
only agenda." When Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, states
that international law only allows force to prevent future attacks and
not retribution, Bush yells, "No. I don't care what the international
lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass."' 4 3
September 12, 2001
President Bush and British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, speak for the
first time since the attacks. Blair suggests that the President look to
solidify international support, but Bush is focused inward on what the
United States can and will do. Bush tells Blair, "I know what I've got
to do. I'm not a good mourner. I'm a weeper. I'll weep for the coun-
try and then act, but I don't want to just hit cruise missiles into the
sand."" After speaking with Blair, Bush speaks with other world
leaders, including those of Canada, France, Italy, China, Germany,
and Japan.
President Bush meets with his national security team. CIA Director,
George Tenet, confirms that Osama bin Laden is responsible for the
attacks. Bush makes it clear that this will be "a different kind of
war,"145 requiring the full resources of national power.
President Bush holds a press conference. He announces, "The delib-
erate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our
142. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 468.
143. Id.
144. BUSH, supra note 1, at 140-41.
145. Id. at 141.
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country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war . . . .
Freedom and democracy are under attack." 46
White House attorneys prepare a draft on the resolution to authorize
the use of military force in response to the attacks. The draft is given
to the leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives. This
draft would give broad, sweeping powers to the President to take any
action against any state, group, or individual in the world at any time
at his discretion.
The Department of Defense discusses broadening the objectives of
the military response to justify attacking Iraq. Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld complains that there are no decent targets to bomb
in Afghanistan, and the U.S. should instead consider bombing Iraq.
Later in the evening, President Bush asks counterterrorism "tsar"
Richard Clarke to look for any shred of evidence linking Saddam
Hussein to the attacks, despite all intelligence pointing directly to al-
Qaeda alone. On March 20, 2003, the United States would initiate a
preemptive war against Iraq.
September 13, 2001
The House and Senate pass the Public Safety Officer Benefits Bill
(Public Law 107-37) authorizing the expedited payment of benefits
for public safety officers killed or catastrophically injured as a result
of the attacks.
The House passes the Victims of Terrorist Relief Act of 2001 (Public
Law 107-134) to amend the IRS Code to provide tax relief to victims
of the attacks. The Senate passed an amended version on November
16, 2001, and both houses of Congress eventually passed it on
December 20, 2001.
September 14, 2001
President Bush speaks at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C.
as part of a national day of prayer and remembrance for the victims.
Among his comments, he says, "Just three days removed from these
events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history, but our
responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and
rid the world of evil."14 7 Later in the day, Bush flies to New York to
visit Ground Zero.
The House and Senate pass the 2001 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist
Attacks on the United States (Public Law 107-38) authorizing $40
billion in emergency funds to be made available to be used for
preparedness in responding to and mitigating the attacks, counterter-
146. Id.
147. Id. at 146.
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rorism, increased transportation security, repairing public facilities
and transportation systems, and national security.
The House and Senate pass the Authorization for Use of Military
Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (Public Law 107-40). The Sen-
ate passed it before 11:00 a.m. The House passed it late that evening.
The President signed it into law on September 18, 2001.
President Bush speaks with British Prime Minister Tony Blair regard-
ing his plans to attack terrorist enemies. Bush again does not speak of
an international effort, but rather a unilateral American response.
Bush tells Blair that Afghanistan is only the beginning, and the next
step is to look at other countries, including Iraq. Blair warns Bush
about the level of evidence that would be required to justify an attack
against Iraq. Bush responds that the U.S. would follow the terrorist
threat wherever it went, and his administration had little doubt that
the trail would lead to Iraq.
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APPENDIx B - AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE 148
Text of Original Draft of Proposed White House Joint
Resolution 10 (September 12, 2001)
Joint Resolution
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against
those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United
States.
Whereas on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were
committed against the United States and its citizens; and
Whereas such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the
United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United
States citizens both at home and abroad; and
Whereas in light of the threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence; and
Whereas such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States,
Now, therefore be it
Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled -
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines
planned, authorized, harbored, committed, or aided in the planning or
commission of the attacks against the United States that occurred on
September 11, 2001, and to deter and pre-empt any future acts of
terrorism or aggression against the United States.
Text of S.J. Res. 23 as passed September 14, 2001, and
signed into law
Joint Resolution
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against
those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United
States.
Whereas on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were
committed against the United States and its citizens;
Whereas such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the
United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United
States citizens both at home and abroad;
148. For the full text of both Joint Resolutions in Appendix B, see GRMMETTr, supra note 111.
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Whereas in light of the threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence;
Whereas such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States;
and
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take
action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the
United States; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for Use
of Military Force."
SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) IN GENERAL. - That the President is authorized to use all nec-
essary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.
(b) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS -
(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION - Consis-
tent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Con-
gress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the
War Powers Resolution.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS - Noth-
ing in this resolution supercedes [sic] any requirement of the
War Powers Resolution.
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